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The European Central Bank and The Federal Reserve

Stephen G. Cecchetti and Róisín O’Sullivan*
December 2002
Abstract
In the four years of its existence, the European Central Bank (ECB) has made significant
contributions to the macroeconomic stability of the Euro area. This paper takes a critical
look at the ECB and compares its institutional structure, policy framework and
operational procedures with those of the longer-established US central bank. We discuss
the implications of various differences between the ECB and the Federal Reserve with a
view toward identifying successful elements of the practices of both these institutions.
The paper recommends that the ECB abandon the first pillar of its monetary policy
strategy that affords a special role to monetary aggregates in the evaluation of financial
market conditions. It also suggests that the Federal Reserve should follow the ECB’s
lead and provide an explicit definition of price stability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the four years since its inception, the European Central Bank (ECB) has played a central role
in both European and global financial markets and has contributed greatly to macroeconomic
stability in the Euro area. From the routine provision of liquidity to emergency fine-tuning
operations in times of crisis, the ECB has succeeded in maintaining an orderly and efficient
Euro-area money market. In addition, although inflation in the region accelerated somewhat
during the first years of the ECB’s existence, it has generally remained close to the target range,
while economic activity in the area has consistently exhibited positive rates of growth.
To what does the ECB owe its success? To what degree does the ECB and the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) to which it belongs mirror the Federal Reserve System (Fed) in
the US? This paper takes a critical look at the ECB and compares its institutional structure,
policy framework and operational procedures with those of the longer-established US central
bank. The implications of various differences found will be discussed with a view to identifying
successful elements of the practices of both these institutions.
The next section recounts briefly the origins of both the ECB and the Fed while section III
examines their institutional structures. This is followed by a discussion of the monetary policy
frameworks of the central banks, including an analysis of the goals of policy. Section V takes a
closer look at the role of monetary aggregates in the evaluation of financial market conditions
while section VI compares how liquidity management operations are typically carried out by the
two institutions. Policy performance is then briefly assessed followed by some thoughts for the
future.
II. ORIGINS OF THE US AND EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANKS
The manner in which Europe’s central bank came about is clearly very different from the
historical circumstances that lead to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System under the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The driving force behind the founding of the Fed was the need to
restore order to the financial system, which had been plagued regularly by banking panics over
the previous decades. It essentially started out as a bankers’ bank, concerned with stabilizing
the financial system, and evolved over time into the modern institution we know today charged
with meeting general economic goals such as low inflation and economic growth.
The Fed’s main tool of monetary policy – open market operations – was actually discovered by
accident during the early 1920’s1. The economic slump following World War 1 meant that
some of the regional federal reserve banks – particularly those in agricultural areas – were in
danger of not generating enough income in the normal course of business with member banks to
cover their expenses. They turned to purchasing Government securities on the open market to
bolster their earnings and, in the process, discovered how credit market conditions could be
influenced by such operations. Soon, the buying and selling of Government securities was
centralized at the New York Fed and by the early 1930’s, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) was established. In this manner, the key elements of current monetary policy making
in the US came into being.
1
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In stark contrast, the establishment of the ECB was the culmination of many decades of work for
which the express purpose was to create a pan-European monetary-policy making institution2.
The explicit path to the establishment of the ECB was set out in the Delors report in the late
1980’s, which specified a three-stage approach to monetary union and a single central bank for
participating members3. The first of these steps involved the setting up of a work program to
achieve monetary union and included the passing of the Maastricht Treaty, which came into
force in 1993. This facilitated the establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI),
which marked the start of the second stage. The task of the EMI was to make preparations for
the establishment of a single currency, the introduction of which would signal the start of stage
three in 1999. The ECB officially came into existence in June 1998, when the 11 original
participating countries appointed the members of its Executive Board.
III. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Economists often ignore one of the central precepts of other social science disciplines:
Institutional structure is crucial for policy outcomes. The design of the ESCB – which includes
the ECB and the national central banks (NCB’s) of all fifteen members of the European Union –
embodies the received wisdom of a century of monetary policy making. The lessons of history
are numerous, and they have all been absorbed. For example, operational policy of the
Eurosystem4 is centrally controlled -- a lesson the Federal Reserve System did not learn until the
1930s. Care has been taken to insure that the ECB is independent from political influence,
thereby avoiding problems that plagued the monetary policy of industrialized and emerging
countries alike in the post-WWII period.
The main decision-making body of the ECB is its Governing Council, a group comprising the
Governors of the twelve NCB’s of the Eurosystem, the President and Vice-President of the ECB
and the four other members of the Executive Board. Monetary policy for the Euro area is
formulated by this Governing Council. The Executive Board is responsible for implementing
the monetary policy decisions made by the Governing Council and its members are appointed by
the Governments of the Euro-area countries5.
The key elements of the Federal Reserve System include the Board of Governors, the twelve
regional reserve banks and the FOMC. The FOMC is the body that makes monetary policy in
the US. The seven Governors that make up the Board of Governors serve on the FOMC along
with the President of the New York Fed and four other regional Fed presidents.
2

See http://www.ecb.int/
Of course, the gradual convergence to monetary union among European Union countries started long
before this, underpinned by the Treaty of Rome (1957) and manifested in increasing economic and
monetary cooperation among countries over time. This process included the management of bilateral
exchange rates among European countries under systems such as the Snake and the Exchange Rate
Mechanism of the European Monetary System.
4
The Eurosystem includes the ECB and the 12 NCB’s of the countries that adopted the common
currency.
5
A third decision-making body called the General Council also exists. It is made up of the President and
Vice-President of the ECB and the 15 Governors of EU member states. This group is responsible for
decisions relating to the enlargement of the Euro area and contributes to the advisory functions of the
ECB. For further details on the institutional structure of the ECB, see “The European Central Bank” at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/ecbbren.pdf .
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On its surface, therefore, the ESCB resembles the Federal Reserve System. There are twelve
regional banks with a central board. But there are important differences. In the Federal
Reserve System there is a sense in which the Board of Governors is in control. At the ECB,
casual observation suggests that the reverse is true. While the Board of Governors supervises
the regional Federal Reserve Banks, approving their budgets and overall management decisions,
in the ESCB, it is the NCB governors who supervise the ECB.
The Governing Council of the ECB resembles the FOMC on the surface as well. Both
formulate monetary policy and draw their membership from both the regional banks and the
central body. But again, appearances can be deceiving. While decisions in both bodies appear
to be taken by consensus, as a technical matter, only five of the Federal Reserve Bank Presidents
vote at any one time in the FOMC. This means that the Governors always comprise a
substantial majority and can outvote the Presidents. The claim is that the Governing Council
does not take formal votes, but even so, the NCB Governors outnumber the Executive Board
members by two to one.
An important difference between the Federal Reserve System and the Eurosystem policymaking
procedures arises from the fact that all of the information provided to the FOMC comes from the
staff of the Board of Governors. There is virtually no relevant information that either comes
from or is produced in consultation with the staffs of the regional Federal Reserve Banks that
finds its way into the hands of all of the participants at an FOMC meeting. The only
information that is universally distributed was generated by at the Board of Governors in
Washington D.C. In contrast, the information that makes its way to the Governing Council is
prepared and compiled in cooperation with the NCB’s, facilitated by an elaborate committee
structure. This means that the economic forecasts, for example, are constructed with explicit
input from the staffs of all of the central banks in the Eurosystem.
Beyond the frequency of the policy meetings, with the Governing Council meeting three times as
often as the FOMC, the meetings differ substantially in attendance. As we understand it, the
Governing Council meets alone (with the exception someone charged with recording minutes).
By contrast, FOMC meetings include between 20 and 30 staff members, as well as the 19
principals.6 Each Reserve Bank President has one staff member present, and a number of
members of the Federal Reserve Board staff are in attendance as well.
Furthermore, at FOMC meetings the staff participates actively. But again, it is primarily the
staff of the Federal Reserve Board that does the talking, with the exception of the System Open
Market Account Manager, who is an employee of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This,
along with the fact that the Governors speak among themselves about policy, serves to further
increase the influence of the Board members over the policy outcomes.
There is one more important difference between the Federal Reserve System and the ESCB, and
that is the fact that the ECB is a bank while the Board of Governors is not. As a consequence, the
ECB itself is capable of operating in financial markets – and they have done so. Surely, the
ESCB structure is set up to insure that the bulk of operations take place at the NCBs. In many
ways, this is the remaining role of these satellites of the ESCB system. But how long can a
6
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system be maintained that has (currently) 13 separate operating locations, each with nearly the
same capability?
The logic of having NCBs maintain regular financial operations is that these central banks have
special knowledge of the mechanisms and participants in their local national markets. But since
one of the major goals of monetary union is to accelerate the development of a pan-European
financial system, it is just a matter of time before things are centralized. There will be an
inexorable pull toward the center, draining resources and power from the periphery.
A number of observers have noted the potential problems created by the fact that one country has
one vote on the Governing Council.7 This creates an inexorable pull toward the median country,
and the objective of stabilizing euro-area prices would be compromised. Both von Hagen and
Brückner (2001) and Alesina, Blanchard, Galí, Giavazzi and Uhlig (2001), suggest that if this
were the outcome, the Executive Board would not be doing its job. As members of the
Governing Council, Governors of the NCB’s of the euro area are responsible for making policy
recommendations on the basis of the economy of the Euro-area as a whole and not on the basis
of the economic situations in their own countries. The ability to do this is facilitated by the lack
of formal voting at Governing Council meetings, which precludes the possibility that a vote by a
particular Governor that was not consistent with the idiosyncratic needs of his own country at
that time would become public. The preponderance of the evidence clearly suggests that that
the Governing Council is following its mandate, and not behaving in a nationalistic way.
IV. MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK
Turning to the policy strategy, there now exist numerous detailed descriptions of the monetary
policy strategy of the ECB and the problems it has created8. As mandated in Article 105(1) of
the Maastricht Treaty, "the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability"
and that "without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general
economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the
objectives of the Community," including "a high level of employment…, substantial and noninflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic
performance." This is what Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence Meyer has called a
hierarchical objective -- price stability first, other things second. This contrasts with what he
refers to at the Fed’s dual mandate, where inflation and growth are on equal footing.

7

Allowing for each EMU country to have a vote on the ECB Governing Council will eventually create an
additional problem as the number of countries participating in monetary union grows. With twelve
countries in EMU there are 18 voting members of the governing council. Without any change in the
voting rules, and if countries joining the European Union become members of the Eurosystem, this
number could potentially become much larger, thereby hampering the ability of the Council to arrive at
consensus decisions. This problem was acknowledged by the Governing Council who agreed in
December, 2002 to limit the number of ECB Governors exercising a voting right to 15 through the use of
a rotation system in the event that enlargement caused the number of Governors to exceed this limit. For
further details, see http://www.ecb.int/press/02/pr021220en.pdf
8
For a description of the strategy, see European Central Bank (2001). The difficulties are discussed in
von Hagen and Bruckner (2002), among others.
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Implementation of the ESCB’s monetary policy required that the Governing Council define what
is meant by the term price stability, and that it formulate a policy strategy. An 18 October 1998
press release entitled “A stability-oriented monetary policy strategy for the ESCB” provide
important operational details for how this objective would be addressed. That press release
(which is available on the ECB’s web site at www.ecb.int) stated that the policy strategy would
have the following three components:
1. The operational definition of price stability would be inflation in the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) of less than two percent per year, in the
medium term9.
2. Money would be assigned a prominent role in the evaluation of financial market
conditions, and that this role would be signaled by the announcement of a
quantitative reference value for the growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate –
they have chosen euro-area M3.
3. A broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price developments and the
risks to price stability in the euro area would play a major role.
Let us take a look at each of these in turn. First, defining price stability in a clear quantitative
manner is extremely difficult. Every inflation measure that we have available to us has its
problems. They are all distorted by problems with weighting, with quality changes, with the
introduction of new goods, with changes in expenditure patterns, and the like. A key problem
with the original design of the HICP was that it did not include owner-occupied housing, an
omission that is particularly significant given the high rate of home-ownership in Europe. This
problem is being addressed, however, and Eurostat and member states are looking at the
possibility of including home ownership in the index on the basis of total expenditure on newly
built or converted dwellings. A final decision on the issue will be based on the analysis of a
pilot series constructed in this manner.
In looking at central bank strategies for achieving price stability objectives, the time horizon is
often a subject of heated debate. Here, again, the ESCB has been criticized for its vague use of
the terminology “medium term.” Our view is that this is not a serious issue. As Mervyn King
(1999) argues, in the end, central banks with inflation objectives will be held accountable in such
a way as to make the time horizon irrelevant. As King notes, if a central bank has a 2% target,
then after 10 years the question will be whether inflation averaged less than 2% over the entire
period. The overriding issue is that longer time horizons give somewhat more flexibility in
responding to short run real factors. Here, we believe the ESCB has done the right thing.
By comparison, the objectives of Federal Reserve System monetary policy are extremely
unclear. The language contained in the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978
currently guides monetary policy in the United States. It states there that the Board of
9

The ESCB was criticized from various quarters for not stating that the operational definition was
inflation in the HICP of between zero and two percent. The suggestion was that somehow the current
formulation left open the possibility of deflation. I view this criticism as inaccurate and generally unfair,
as the term inflation, clearly implies a range of zero to two.
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Governors and the FOMC are required to "maintain growth of money and credit aggregates
commensurate with the economy's long-run potential to increase production, so as to promote
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest
rates." This has been interpreted to mean that monetary policy should foster maximum
sustainable growth and price stability.
Importantly, though, there are no numbers attached to what is meant by any of this. Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan has said that he believes "We will be at price stability
when households and businesses need not factor expectations of changes in the average price
level into their decisions."10 But this statement seems very imprecise. What level of what price
index constitutes price stability? Different people will have different interpretations.
The lack of clarity in the objectives of the FOMC creates an enormous problem for decisionmaking. How can a committee agree on policy actions if they do not agree on their objectives
even privately among themselves? Surely it would be a step in the right direction to follow the
course suggested by Governor Meyer (2001) if the FOMC would adopt an explicit definition of
price stability and make it publicly known.
Even with clearly defined objectives and a well-specified framework for implementation,
however, monetary policymakers cannot hope to continually meet their inflation and growth
goals without the support of prudent and consistent policy-making by other branches of
Government. Recent developments in Argentina, for example, illustrate how poor fiscal policy
can make it impossible for central bankers to do their jobs. The question arises, therefore, as to
how monetary authorities should handle this interdependence among various areas of
macroeconomic policy.
In our view, central banks can best meet their goals by focusing on using the instruments at their
disposal and under their control to pursue their policy objectives. The responsibility for fiscal
policy and structural reform lies with the elected members of parliaments, congresses and senates
and it is not appropriate for central banks to comment officially on these policies or to try to
influence them formally.
Traditionally the Fed, as an institution, has not commented on US fiscal policy although
Chairman Greenspan has aired his views about fiscal stimulus in recent times. In Europe, the
scope for fiscal policy to undermine the ECB’s inflation objective is severely curtailed by the
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. The ECB has expressed its views on the Pact
formally, most recently in the form of a press statement on the Pact from the Governing Council.
Moreover, President Duisenberg has repeatedly called for the implementation of a structural
reform agenda covering reforms in labor, product and financial markets. We believe that, while
fiscal and structural policies clearly have an impact on the goals of monetary policy, it is not the
role of the central bank to bring pressure to bear on how these policies are formulated. Rather,
central bankers should focus on their role as technicians, reacting to the macroeconomic
environment in which they operate in a transparent and well-defined manner.

10
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We now move on to the second two components of the ECB strategy, often referred to as the
“two pillars.” These are the prominent role for money and the use of a range of indicators for
future price developments. The first of these has come under substantial attack. As Alesina,
Blanchard, Galí, Giavazzi and Uhlig (2001) write, the ultimate goal of the ESCB is to keep
inflation low. In actual fact, they have been doing something that closely resembles inflationforecast targeting. It is difficult to see in this context why M3 is special. A more detailed look
at this issue is deferred to the next section of the paper.
Turning briefly to the second pillar, who can argue with the strategy of using broadly based
assessment future price developments? Addressing uncertainties by bring all possible
information to bear -- including that in broad monetary aggregates -- is the obvious thing to do.
Importantly, though, it leads to inflation-forecast targeting, and it would be helpful if the ESCB
were clear that this is what they are doing.
V. THE ROLE OF MONETARY AGGREGATES
It is evident that the most controversial element of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy is
undoubtedly the first pillar - the prominent role assigned to money in the evaluation of financial
market conditions. The inclusion of the first pillar has been defended on the basis that money
plays a central role in all well-established theories of inflation and that this special role provides
continuity with previous practices of member central banks (Issing et al. 2001). It is more
likely, however, that the logic behind the inclusion of the first pillar was based on socio-political
considerations rather than economic ones. It provided a way for the Governing Council to
hedge its bets until it had a chance to see what was going to work.
But we are now four years on, and the same arguments no longer apply. Instead, we can think
of the ECB as just another central bank that controls interest rates in an effort to meet an inflation
objective. Money is surely helpful in doing this, but then so are many other things. At this
point, the first pillar merely stands in the way of effective communication.
Beyond these conceptual issues, it is worth noting that the first pillar of the policy strategy has
already caused some technical problems. The ECB defines M3 to include only currency,
deposits and marketable financial instruments held by euro area residents (European Central
Bank 2001: 32-33). Needless to say, it is difficult to discern the ultimate owner of deposit
accounts or liquid financial instruments, and so estimating the size of euro-area M3 is not a
trivial task. This difficulty created substantial problems in the spring of 2001. In his news
conference on 10 May 2001, ECB President Duisenberg stated that “there have been indications
that the monetary growth figures are distorted upwards by non-euro area residents' purchases of
negotiable paper included in M3. This has now been confirmed by clear evidence, and the
magnitudes involved are significant.”
How much emphasis has the Governing Council placed on the behavior of monetary aggregates
over the past four years? Does the behavior of money really attract more attention at the ECB
than it does at the Fed or does the first pillar merely reflect a difference in the presentation rather
than the substance of policy strategy?

7

One major area of difference between the two central banks in the last couple of years has been
in the announcement of targets for the growth of money. In the Federal Reserve Board’s 20 July
2000 Monetary Policy Report to Congress there is a footnote that reads:11
"At its June meeting, the FOMC did not establish ranges for growth of money and debt in
2000 and 2001. The legal requirement to establish and to announce such ranges had
expired, and owing to uncertainties about the behavior of the velocities of debt and
money, these ranges for many years have not provided useful benchmarks for the conduct
of monetary policy. Nevertheless, the FOMC believes that the behavior of money and
credit will continue to have value for gauging economic and financial conditions, and this
report discusses recent developments in money and credit in some detail."
The ECB, on the other hand, periodically publishes what they call a reference rate for money
growth. On the face of it, therefore, it would seem that the ECB affords money a more
prominent role, consistent with the first pillar. The fact that most references by ECB officials to
this “reference” rate, that was interestingly not called a “target”, involved explaining why
deviations from the reference rate were not important undermines this conclusion.
To evaluate this issue further, we turn to what is probably the most natural place to look - to what
policy makers say they actually take into account when making decisions. For the period of
interest, information available from the Fed includes a press statement following each FOMC
meeting and minutes of these meetings. The ECB also issues press statements announcing
policy changes and usually provides transcripts from a press conference with the ECB president
explaining the factors behind the decisions of the Governing Council12.
The most striking thing we noticed on examining the minutes from the meetings of the FOMC
and the longer press statements following Governing Council meetings was the similarities
between the references made to the developments in the monetary aggregates by the two groups.
Each usually included a paragraph on money when discussing the factors leading to their policy
decision. There seemed to be little apparent difference in substance between the emphases
placed on money as an information variable by the Fed and by the ECB, although cosmetic
differences did appear in the form of references to the first pillar in the ECB statements. Over
the past four years, neither institution ever referred to monetary aggregate developments in the
short press statement they release announcing their policy decisions, although it should be noted
that, unlike the Fed, the ECB has not tending to include any rationale for their decisions in these
brief statements.
Where a greater focus on monetary aggregates did emerge was in the transcripts of the question
times that generally followed the press statements by President Duisenberg of the ECB.
(Unfortunately, no direct comparison can be made to the Fed here.). In almost every press
conference, at least one question was directed at the ECB president regarding monetary
aggregate developments, requiring additional emphasis being placed on these developments over
11

This is footnote 2 in Section 1 of the report. It is available on the Federal Reserve Board’s web site at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2000/July/ReportSection1.htm.
12
Full transcripts of the FOMC meetings are made available to the public at a five-year lag while minutes
of the Governing Council meetings will be made available only after a twenty-year lag. The information
used in the current analysis has been taken from the web sites of the Fed and the ECB.
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and above other information variables. What is important here is the fact that this additional
emphasis has been driven by the financial community and not by the ECB and may often reflect
confusion arising from the stated special role of monetary developments, which may not always
be consistent with policy decisions. While the exact degree to which monetary developments
are actually considered cannot be know with certainty until the minutes of the meetings are
available, it certainly appears that the explicit special role afforded to money over and above
other information variables has merely served to confuse rather than to clarify. This leads us to
agree with those who say that the first pillar stands in the way of effective communication and
should be jettisoned.
VI.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

The ECB and the Fed use similar tools to implement monetary policy, although some differences
do exist between the methods used to manage the money market and influence short-term
interest rates. In this section, we briefly outline the main procedures used by each of the central
banks and then assess the relative merits of the two approaches.
Most of the liquidity supplied to the market by the Fed comes from overnight repurchase
agreements (repos) carried out between the Open Market Desk at the New York Fed and a small
number of designated dealers. These repurchase agreements are essentially collateralized loans
and involve the Fed providing reserves to a dealer in exchange for Government securities and
agreeing to reverse the transaction at a future date.
The level of reserves to supply is decided each morning based on forecasts for reserve demand
with a view to keeping the federal funds rate as close to its target as possible. The Fed enters the
market only once a day – with the exact time of the intervention randomized slightly by the
throwing of a ten-sided die. Interventions take place at 9.30 plus the number of minutes
obtained from the die throw. This method ensures that market participants know that they
cannot get any information out of the exact timing of the operation. In addition to these shortrun temporary operations, the Fed responds to forecasts of sustained increases in reserve demand
by purchasing Government securities outright in the secondary market13.
The other, less important, monetary policy tools available to the Fed are reserve requirements
and the discount rate. Reserve requirements are not used to try to influence inflation and growth
but serve to stabilize the demand for reserves, making it easier for the Fed to control the federal
funds rate. The discount rate determines the cost of funds available for banks to borrow through
the discount window14. In the past, banks seldom borrowed from the discount facility in the
normal course of events, however, despite funds being available at an interest rate that was
below the prevailing market rate. The reason for this is that banks were obliged to exhaust all
other sources of funds before going to the discount window and so discount borrowing was seen
as a signal that the bank was in trouble.

13

While the Fed primarily engages in operations to add reserves to the market, it can withdraw liquidity
through matched-sale-purchase agreements (reverse repos) or by selling securities.
14
The term discount rate is usually used in relation to lending under the adjustment credit program – one
of three types of credit (the others being seasonal credit and extended credit) currently available through
the discount window.
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In October 2002, the Board of Governors approved a plan to revise the discount window
programs15. The main change involves the provision of loans to healthy banks at a rate set at
100 basis points above the federal funds target. Under the new plan, there will no longer be a
stipulation that banks have to exhaust all other source of funding before borrowing from this
facility and so no stigma associated with using the facility. These changes provide the US
financial system with a source of funds available at the discretion of the borrowers similar to
standing facilities provided by central banks in other countries.
Like the Fed, the main way the ECB provides liquidity to the market is through open market
operations. They refer to these as “refinancing operations” and conduct them according to a
pre-arranged schedule on a weekly basis. The loans provided through these weekly auctions
have a two-week maturity, although loans with a maturity of three months are available through
longer-term operations that are conducted on a monthly basis. The ECB may also carry out
fine-tuning and structural operations from time to time. Table 1 sets out the main operational
tools of the ECB and the Fed.
The refinancing operations of the ECB are really repurchase agreements, where the ECB,
through the National Central Banks, gives banks reserves in exchange for securities, and then
reverses the transaction two weeks later. These operations provide banks with virtually all of
their reserves, and account for between 15 and 20 percent of the ECB’s balance sheet. Day-today monetary policy sets the minimum bid rate on these refinancing operations. In other words,
the ECB will not accept any bids that are below the rate set by the Governing Council.
The ECB also provides overnight loans to banks – at a rate known as the marginal lending rate –
that is normally significantly above the target-refinancing rate. The spread between this lending
rate and the target refinancing rate is determined by the Governing Council, and is currently set
at 100 basis points. As in the case of discount borrowing, use of the marginal lending facility is
initiated by the commercial banks when they feel that they face a reserve deficiency that they
cannot satisfy in the marketplace. Banks don’t borrow regularly, although on occasion the
amounts can be large.
The ECB’s requires banks to hold minimum reserve levels based on the level of liabilities that
they hold and remunerate these required reserves at the average of the refinancing rate over the
relevant period. Banks with excess reserves at the end of the day can deposit them overnight at
an interest rate that is substantially below the target refinancing rate. Again, the spread is
determined by the Governing Council and is currently 100 basis points. While usually small,
these deposits have been substantial on particular days as they include all excess reserves that are
in the banks of the Eurosystem.

15

The changes are effective from 9 January 2003. For details on the proposal, see the press release on
the Board of Governors web site at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2002/200210312/default.htm
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Table 1: Operational Policies of the ECB and the Fed
ECB

FED

Open Market Operations
Main

Other

- Reverse transactions at
weekly auctions with
maturities of two weeks

- Repurchase agreements on a
daily basis usually of very
short-term maturity but
maturity can range from 1 to
90 days
- Reverse transactions with 3- - Outright purchases or sales
month maturities conducted on of Government securities,
a monthly basis
usually once a week
- Non-standard fine-tuning
operations using various
instruments

Standing Facilities
Loan

Deposit

Marginal Lending Facility

Discount Window

- Overnight facility at an
interest rate (marginal lending
rate) 100 basis points above
the target refinancing rate

- Various lending schemes, the
key one being the provision of
overnight adjustment credit at
an interest rate (discount rate)
25-50 basis points below the
target for the fed funds rate.

Deposit Facility

None

- Overnight facility at an
interest rate 100 basis points
below the target refinancing
rate

Reserve Requirements
Reserve Ratio

Remuneration

- 2% of checking accounts and
some other short-term deposits
averaged over a month
- At the average of the
refinancing rate over the
period
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- From 0-10% on a graduated
scale based on two-week
average balances on accounts
with unlimited checking
privileges
- None

While the ECB’s refinancing operations are broadly similar to the Fed’s daily open market
operations, there are differences. The most important is that the operations are done at all of the
NCB’s in the Eurosystem simultaneously. This makes the operations much more complex. It
involves both coordination among a dozen central banks and the handling of transactions with
literally hundreds of banks. To give some idea of the amount of potential counterparties, at end2000, some 2500 of the over 7500 credit institutions in the Euro area met the criteria to be a
counterparty to these operations and between 400 and 600 institutions actually participated in the
tenders for the main refinancing operations (ECB, 2001: 63). Recall, in the U.S. everything is
done at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, with the Open Market desk only transacting
with a short list about 20 securities dealers. In addition, due to the differences in financial
structure in different countries, the ECB has to contend with a much wider range of potential
collateral in its refinancing operations, with the list of acceptable collateral differing by country.
Under normal circumstances, the Fed just deals with U.S. Government securities.16 The other
factor that makes the ECB set up inherently more cumbersome and more risky than that in the
US is the sheer volume of funds that is refinanced on a regular basis.
Figures 1 and 2 show the behavior of key US and European interest rates. Figure 1 shows the
federal funds target rate since 1996 along with the average rate on interbank transactions during
the day. You can see that, by and large, the Fed is able to keep the market interest rate close to
the target, although, every so often, the market rate spikes. As information systems have
improved both within banks and at the Fed, however, there have been fewer surprises in the daily
reserve market in more recent times and so the deviations of the daily federal funds rate from the
target have become very small.17
Figure 2 illustrates the key interest rates in the Euro Area. The target refinancing rate is the
solid line going through the center of the corridor created by the standing facility rates. The
overnight cash rate is the European analog to the federal funds rate – the rate banks charge each
other for overnight loans. In contrast to the behaviour of the effective rate in figure 1, the
overnight cash rate is always inside the band and so always within 100 basis points of the target
refinancing rate. From figure 1, you can see that, over the six and one-half-year period plotted
there, the funds rate was more than 100 basis points away from the target 19 times – about 3
times per year. The European system is clearly more successful in giving policymakers control
of the short-term interest rate. The spikes in the US data will disappear, however, upon
implementation of the new discount facility, which resembles closely the ECB system.

VII.

POLICY PERFORMANCE

Results are the real test of policy. Numerous people have examined the brief history of ECB
policy in various ways. A decade ago John Taylor (1993) suggested the history of the U.S.
Federal Funds Rate could be adequately explained by a simple rule in which the policy rate
16

They accept securities issued both by the U.S. Treasury and those issued by government-sponsored
agencies like the Federal National Mortgage Corporation.
17
The easiest way to see this is to look at the daily standard deviation of the federal funds rate available
on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s web site. While there used to be days when the standard
deviation was near one percentage point, it is now almost never above 0.3 percentage points.
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depended on a long-run equilibrium interest rate, the deviation of inflation from a target level
and the output gap. It has become very fashionable for academic researchers to compare actual
interest rate paths to those implied by various versions of what are commonly called “Taylor
rules,” and analysis of the ECB is no different18.
Such exercises conclude that interest rates were initially too low, and later were too high. The
question is whether it is possible to actually evaluate policy using such an exercise. If the rule
had been followed at the beginning of the period, then inflation and growth would have been
different later. This is obvious, and what it means is that you cannot look at the actual policy
relative to a Taylor-style rule without embedding the rule in a fully articulated dynamic structural
model of the euro area.
Originally, Taylor viewed this as a way of summarizing policy history, not a prescription for
future action. In recent years, researchers and policymakers have taken this rule and examined
its properties for policymaking. Such exercises must be done with great care, however. In
particular, evaluation of the rule can only be done if it is embedded into a dynamic model of the
economy as changes in the interest-rate instrument that deviate from historical experience will
drive inflation and output away from their historical paths as well.
Rather than build such a model (or borrow one), we will simply look at the performance of the
ESCB since its inception. Figures 3 and 4 plot GDP growth and inflation in the Euro area.
Growth data begin in 1992 and inflation data in 1996 – this is what is available from Eurostat
and the ECB. It is surely difficult to tell from these data what the consequence of recent policy
will be, but we can nevertheless make a preliminary evaluation. The results give the impression
that policy has been more successful in fostering steady growth, initially at least, than in keeping
inflation in check, as HICP inflation rose unabated over the first few years of the ECB. This
provides some support for the von Hagen and Brückner conclusion that policy was too lose early
on. Since mid-2001, however, the index has shown a downward trend, resulting in an average
inflation rate since the establishment of the ECB of 2.02 percent, close to the upper band of the
target range.
In terms of achieving price stability over a medium term horizon, therefore, it appears that the
ECB has essentially done its job. While it is interesting to compare how the ECB’s policy
actions have mirrored or differed from what the Fed or an EU wide Bundesbank would have
done, surely the achievement of its mandated objectives is what counts.
This is not to say that its policymaking was optimal and might not have been too loose or too
tight at various points in its history. It is true that the Federal Reserve has enjoyed greater
success in the more recent past in re-igniting growth and keeping inflation low, while the ECB
has seemed somewhat slow in loosening policy. The idea that this reluctance to reduce interest
rates was motivated by a strict adherence to the first pillar of the monetary policy strategy in the
face of growth rates in M3 monetary aggregate consistently several percentage points above the
reference value, doesn’t bear out, however The observation by Begg et al. (2002b) that actual
ECB decisions have been negatively correlated with nominal money growth is telling. It is
18

See, for example, Von Hagen and Brückner (2002).
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likely that the ECB's strategy reflected a more gradualist approach given the greater uncertainty
that the ECB faced regarding the environment in which it operated and the transmission
mechanism through which its policy actions reach the real economy.
VIII.

THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

The report so far on the ECB is of a new institution that has faced numerous challenges head on
and come out only mildly bruised. It is difficult to see how things could have come out any
better than they have. But this is not the end of the story. The future challenges of the ESCB
are nearly as daunting as those of the past, with the biggest problems likely to continue to arise
from conflicts among national interests in policy setting.
A key and unique challenge facing the ECB over the next few years is the inevitable increase in
the number of nations whose monetary policy it coordinates. With the accession of ten
countries into the EU planned for May 2004 adding to the number of potential mew members, it
is likely that national considerations will remain central to many of the challenges facing the
institution.
One of the areas where national considerations are currently apparent at a practical level is in the
cumbersome system through which the ECB provides liquidity to the money market. While
differences in national financial structures may have warranted such a decentralized system in
the early days, it surely makes sense to centralize these operations in the future. In addition, a
structural adjustment to reduce the enormous volume of liquidity routinely provided to credit
institutions through short-term operations along with a cutback in the potential number of
counterparties to these operations would aid the system to function more efficiently. Another
issue that we feel should be addressed is the role of monetary aggregates in the formulation of
monetary policy. There seems little to be gained by assigning a special place to money in the
assessment of financial conditions and much confusion to be wrought by the unpredictable
behavior of these impossible to measure statistics. The path taken by the Fed recently to
discontinue the publication of target ranges for the growth of money and debt is, we believe, the
correct one.
The ECB has announced that it will be undertaking a comprehensive review of its policy making
strategy in the first half of 2003, which may well signal the end of the first pillar. This would
mitigate the need for endless explanations and qualifications of monetary growth data and
undoubtedly improve the transparency of its policy making. There is also speculation that this
re-evaluation may lead to a softening of the ECB’s target for price stability. Critics have argued
that the ECB have focused excessively on inflation, to the neglect of secondary goals relating to
output and employment. In our view, such a fundamental change to its monetary policy strategy
so early on would not be wise. Undergoing a re-evaluation of its policy framework at this stage
is a courageous move and using the opportunity to improve communication and transparency is
surely a good idea. Changing the specified objective of monetary policy a mere four years on is
not. The continued targeting of HICP of 2 percent or lower is, in our view, wholly consistent
with goals of sustained economic growth and healthy employment levels. The most we would
endorse would be the very modest change to a target range of 1 to 3 percent inflation over the
medium term. But even that would have to be explained within the context of a combination of
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the likely upward bias present in the HICP and he relatively higher inflation in the 10 accession
countries.19
While the ECB would do well to follow the Fed’s lead on the treatment of monetary aggregates,
there are also lessons for the Fed to take from the ECB. This is already happening in the form of
the changes to the Fed’s discount window policy. The other place where the Fed could take a
leaf from the ECB’s book relates to the clarity with which the goals of monetary policy are
defined. The Fed needs to spell out precisely what is meant by “maximum employment” and
“stable prices” and give some sense of the priorities they will impose when these two goals come
into conflict. Undoubtedly, the need to elucidate goals has been much more important for the
ECB, as a new institution with a need to effectively communicate with twelve distinct national
entities, than it has been for the long-established Fed with its veteran leader. These
circumstances, however, will inevitably change sometime in the not-so-distant future.

19

Recent experiments with the U.S. CPI suggest that bias in that index may still be as high as one
percentage point. The HICP surely has a bigger upward bias. Because of their relatively high growth
rates, the accession countries will be at the upper end of the inflation range in the euro area. This means
that if the inflation target is set at too low a level, the more advanced countries could experience steady
deflation, something that is to be avoided.

15

Figure 1: U.S. Federal Funds Rate Target and Effective Rate:
January 1996 - August 2002
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Figure 2: ECB Money Market Interest Rates:
January 1999 to June 2002
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Figure 3: Real GDP Growth in the Euro Area
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Figure 4: Inflation in the Euro Area
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